Book: The Reason for God, by Timothy Keller
The success of Keller's church sounds surprising when you learn that the church is pretty evangelical in theology, because (going by the people he quotes objecting to Christianity) New York is apparently full of the American equivalent of Guardian readers. But having seen Keller's style, I can see why he's successful. He deals sensitively with the human problems people might have had with the church or with conservative Christians as well as the factual arguments. He admits where arguments are only suggestive rather than conclusive, and he mentions the arguments against his position. He admits that there's no argument that will persuade everyone, so the best thing is to look for arguments that will persuade most of the people, most of the time.
Ultimately, though, I think Keller shows more good will than reason, which makes the title a bit of a misnomer. Keller shows that you can construct a Christianity that hangs together, that a belief in God isn't completely crazy. That's certainly necessary, but hardly sufficient, for a reasonable person to believe it. A lot of the book is assertions without evidence for them, when evidence is precisely what is required.
That said, since the book is better than most Christian attempts at evangelism I've read or seen lately, I thought I'd do a couple of posts on it, of which this is the first.
Arguments against God
The book is divided into two parts: one dealing with the arguments against God, which Keller wants to show are faulty; and one dealing with the arguments for God. We'll look at his responses to objections, using the chapter headings from the book.
There can't be just one true religion
There's no logical basis for such an argument, as Keller rightly says, because there might actually be one true religion.
What people voicing this objection really seem to be worrying about is the danger that thinking you have the Truth will make you arrogant or even violent towards those who don't agree. Keller says that the bad stuff done by Christians was against the teachings of Christianity, that is, that those people weren't True Scotsmen.
Someone like Keller wouldn't have gone on a Crusade and wouldn't shoot abortionists, so those things are certainly against Keller's sort of Christianity. However, Keller's assertion rests on his interpretation of Christianity being the True Christianity (or at least, Truer), a view which wasn't shared by Crusaders. As God is silent, how can Keller persuade Crusaders of his rightness? A general caution against arrogance when you think you know the absolute truth sounds like a good idea. Perhaps we should try believing things to the extent that we have evidence for them, for example?
How could a good God allow suffering?
Keller argues that modern philosophers don't accept that evil can be used to disprove God. God might have reasons for doing stuff which we don't currently understand, and in fact, if he's much cleverer than us, reasons we may be unable to understand.
This is true as far as it goes, and indeed leaves some possibility that God exists and is good. But, once again, I recommend believing in stuff to the extent that we have evidence for it. To use Gareth's analogy, if we're told someone is a chess grandmaster, yet is is apparently playing very badly, we might at first think that he is adopting some strategy we don't understand, but as the game goes on, as his opponent hoovers up his pieces without apparent effort, we might begin to suspect we've been misinformed about this so-called grandmaster.
Some Christians might respond that a dramatic reversal is on the way, but their evidence for that is poor. Even by the late New Testament period, teaching about the Second Coming is being shored up by suspicious pre-emptive excuses for why it hasn't happened. So far, the state of the board is evidence against the idea that God is good and able to intervene.
Keller goes on to say that atheists have no moral basis for calling something evil, re-iterating the moral argument discussed in a previous entry. He's wrong, of course: the basis is our dislike of our own suffering, and our empathy for others, two things which are basic experiences in most people. Someone without these might not have a moral basis for expecting God to do something about suffering, but if you don't like suffering and aren't a sociopath, you've got a basis for worrying about theodicy.
Christianity is a straitjacket
The objection to Christianity which Keller is responding to here seems to be a sort of "The Man is keeping you down, Man" statement, with God as the ultimate party pooper/Daily Mail reader/imperialist. It seems to come from woolly relativists who turn up to Keller's church in New York. There's no logic to this objection, since there's no reason why such a God couldn't exist and disapprove of the continual debauch which makes up the life of every atheist.
The Church is responsible for so much injustice
Along with C.S. Lewis, whose works Keller treats as a sort of New New Testament, Keller argues that you shouldn't judge Christianity by Christians, because the church attracts strange and damaged people (like me, for example) and when you meet someone, you don't know what they've been through in their past.
The assumption here is that there's a good reason for changes brought about by God to take a long time. It's odd that it does for some people and not others, though, isn't it? If God can turn around Saul and those former drug addicts you get giving their testimonies at some churches, you'd've thought he wouldn't have so much trouble making some Christians (who the Bible says have God living in them, remember) less insufferable, for example. It's almost as if there's no supernatural involvement at all: some people dramatically change their lives when exposed to some ideas, and others only partially absorb them and take time to move.
The rest of the chapter is the religion vs secularism murder drinking game (drink if the theist mentions Pol Pot or Stalin, drink if the atheist mentions the Crusades or 911, down your glass if anyone mentions Hitler). This can be fun and can motivate your side, but I'm not sure it moves the theist/atheist debate anywhere, so while I have engaged in it in the past, I now think is pretty pointless. I don't see any way of showing that Christians are any better or worse than atheists, so the original objection that Keller is responding to doesn't seem a good one. Arguably, though, if Christianity is true, Christians ought to be clearly better.
How can a loving God send people to Hell?
Keller says that our problem with judgement is cultural, and that other cultures exposed to Christianity like the judgement stuff but don't like the turning the other cheek stuff. He says he asked one person who objected to Hell whether she would say that her culture was superior to non-Western ones. The right answer to this is "Well, I think my personal morality is, otherwise what the Hell am I doing?" or possibly "Well, maybe not in general, but I'm fairly sure eternal torture is a bad thing". Keller's politically correct one-up-manship is a good way to make woolly relativists back down, so presumably works against the liberals who turn up at his New York church.
Keller then moves on to argue that God doesn't send people to Hell, as such. His view of judgement owes more to the bowdlerisation of Hell in C.S. Lewis's New New Testament than it does to the New Testament. Lewis and Keller think that Hell is a continuation of the soul's trajectory at death, that the gates of Hell are locked from the inside, that Hell is ultimately God saying "have it your way". Lewis says "It is not a question of God 'sending us' to hell. In each of us, there is something growing, which will BE Hell unless it is nipped in the bud".
To support Lewis's ideas, Keller quotes Romans 1:24-26, a passage about God "giving people over" to their sins. This passage is actually about red-hot girl-on-girl action, not the fires of Hell. The New Testament is a bit less reticent about God's role in sending people to Hell than Keller. Reading it, you'll find that God has appointed a day, and a judge who will condemn people to the fire. It's hard to fit this positive action from God into Keller's scheme.
So where did Keller's ideas come from? Lewis's (and hence Keller's) Hell is the Buddhist Hungry Ghosts realm, but without the possibility of rebirth. People in Keller's Hell are dominated by their addictions, but these cannot satisfy them, and this continues forever. The fires of this Hell are the disintegration caused by self-centredness and addiction.
Alas, you'll find none of this stuff in the Bible, where the fire is punishment from God (the correct evangelical term is eternal conscious torment). Keller quotes the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus in support of the Hungry Ghost Hell. His exposition of the passage talks about how the Rich Man is self-centred in that he still expects Lazarus to fetch water for him, but unfortunately ignores the fact that this is because the Rich Man is being tortured by fire.
Since Keller's Hell is the Hungry Ghosts realm, I wondered what his response would be to people attempting to avoid self-centredness by other means. Keller says that "When we build our lives on anything but God, that thing - though a good thing - becomes an enslaving addiction, something we have to have to be happy". This claim is asserted without evidence.
Keller offers poor evidence for believing Lewis over the Bible about hell. The Bible's actual view is less palatable than Lewis's, and evangelical Christians (like the rest of us) need to face up to the parts of their beliefs which hurt to think about. Hell is torture at God's express command. If you believe in the Bible's version, you think your non-Christian family and friends morally deserve to be in torment forever, and you accept that they probably will be unless they convert. Somehow, in tandem with this, you must try to believe that God is loving and very intelligent. Good luck with that one. It's no wonder that most evangelicals (with some notable exceptions) believe they should believe in Hell, but don't actually believe in it.
Science has disproved Christianity
Keller, quoting Nagel, argues that naturalism is a philosophy which science uses but cannot prove. So, he says, if anyone's arguing there can't be a God merely because they have a prior commitment to naturalism, they're assuming their conclusion. I wouldn't disagree here.
Keller goes into an extensive digression about how many scientists believe in God. Like the murder drinking game, we need to be a bit careful here, both when reading Dawkins and when reading Keller. What counts as evidence for God's activity (or lack of it) is the opinion of domain experts in areas where God is said to have acted (like, say, the opinion of biologists and geologists on creationism, or the opinion of psychologists and anthropologists on religious experiences). The rest is pretty much irrelevant: there's nothing so stupid that you can't find someone with a PhD who believes it.
He talks a lot about evolution, probably because creationism is an embarrassment to Christianity for scientifically educated people who turn up at his church. He says he accepts some form of evolution, but, unlike Dawkins, he doesn't accept evolution as a worldview. The argument is quite confused at this point, and it's not clear what he means by "evolution as a worldview". Quotable quote: "When evolution is turned into an all-encompassing theory explaining absolutely everything we believe, feel and do as the product of natural selection, then we were not in the arena of science, but of philosophy". Keller appears to have mixed up Dawkins's views on evolution with Dawkins's general belief in naturalism, since I doubt Dawkins supports the quoted position.
Keller says he himself believes that God guided some kind of process of natural selection (making it a process of supernatural selection, I suppose). Keller has effectively retrofitted Genesis to modern scientific theories. God presumably knew he used evolution to create life when he inspired Genesis, so it is a little odd that he doesn't mention it. A Bronze Age level explanation of evolution would have been no more wacky than many other creation myths, and would have the advantage that the Bible would look a lot more impressive when a scientific culture discovered it was right.
Keller tells his readers not to worry about all this disagreement among Christians about evolution. Look at the core claims of Christianity, he says, not at this side issue. Unfortunately, some of those core claims conflict with evolution. For example, there's the claim that, just as death entered the world through Adam's sin, Jesus's death for humanity's sins conquered sin and hence death, as demonstrated by the Resurrection. Does Keller think that the Fall was an event in history, and is he arguing that nothing died before the Fall? If Keller has answers to those sorts of objections (which usually come from other Christians, namely the creationists), he doesn't tell us what they are and how he knows they're right.
He rightly says that the evidence for the conventional theory of evolution can't be used to show that theistic evolution didn't happen, which is sufficient to do away with the objection he's responding to, if the objector specifically has evolution in mind. It's a pretty poor objection, though, as science doesn't really prove anything. Perhaps a more interesting objection to claims of God's activity in the world would be to say that God is inert and ask someone like Keller to show why anyone would believe otherwise.
You can't take the Bible literally
Keller limits himself to talking about the Gospels. He says that they were written too soon after Jesus's life to be fictionalised accounts, because their first readers could have checked up on their accuracy; their content isn't what we'd expect of legends composed by the early church (the female witnesses to the Resurrection, Peter's denial of Jesus when Peter went on to head the church); and that the gospels have the literary form of eye-witness accounts, but the modern novel had not been invented yet, so they are intended as reportage.
I'm no historian, so I'm not really able to check these claims out. I'd be interested to know what my readers think, and I'll probably be looking into this stuff at some point in the future. My meta-problem with this stuff is having to rely on ancient written accounts of stuff I give very low credence to by default. Does God really want us all to become experts in ancient literature? I can think of easier ways to convince me.
Keller then addresses cultural, rather than historical, objections to the Bible, arguing, along with New New Testament author C.S. Lewis, that such objections may be assuming that older societies were "primitive", but that our grandchildren may find some of our beliefs equally primitive. Imagine Anglo-Saxons and modern Brits reading two stories, Jesus's claim that he will judge the world, and Peter's denial of Jesus and later restoration. The responses to the two stories will be quite different, Keller argues, so who are we to say that judgement is bad and wrong but Jesus's forgiveness of Peter is right.
So, Keller argues, rather than saying "bits of the Bible are sexist, therefore Jesus wasn't raised from the dead" (which is, as he says, a non sequitur), we should decide whether Jesus is the Son of God, and if he is, we should have confidence in what the Bible says because the Bible tells us Jesus had such a high view of it (even of the New Testament and New New Testament, which hadn't been written yet). This is a perfectly valid argument.
Some of the objections Keller gets from New Yorkers are ill considered, and Keller bats them aside easily. In other cases (theodicy and Hell), his method is to argue that there's still a chance that Christianity is true, so the objections aren't completely conclusive. I don't find this that impressive, because the sensible objector isn't claiming that their objections are conclusive, merely that they're strong evidence. To defeat that, one must produce stronger evidence, which as we'll see in the next part, Keller fails to do.