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| Following on from my link to The Ad Hominem Fallacy Fallacy, ![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif) londonkds wonders how legitimate it is to say "This person has previously shown themselves to be ignorant/misinformed/lying/batshit on this subject on several occasions, therefore I have better things to do with my time than to rigorously investigate all their arguments this time". I've replied on the original thread, but I thought I'd create a new post with my reply in:  Reminds me of Yudkowsky's stuff on reversed stupidity and the follow up, Argument Screens Off Authority. If someone is reliably wrong (a well informed liar), you can learn something by listening to them: you just increase the weight you give to beliefs which contradict what they say on topics where you know they tend to lie. But this might not be useful, if you already strongly believe stuff which contradicts what they say. In practice, the people are ignorant or batshit haven't carefully studied how to be wrong. There are more ways to be wrong than right, so they probably are wrong, but you don't learn anything by listening to them, because their statements aren't tangled up with the truth at all. As Yudkowsky and brokenhut say, you can decide not to listen to such people because life is too short, but that decision shouldn't influence your opinion on the truth of their argument (though it's hard not to be influenced in practice). So I think your quoted statement is a justifiable one as long as you don't append "and I'll believe their argument less as a result". Suber's stuff on logical rudeness covers the case where your belief that they're batshit is because of some theory you hold which includes explanations of how all critics of the theory are batshit (examples exist in evangelical Christianity, atheism and feminism, that I've seen). ISTM that such a theory can't be used to dismiss critical arguments, though it can be used to explain why so many people apparently don't believe the theory. (You can comment on the original post: I've disabled comments on this one to keep all the discussion in one place). | |
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| The talk to CUAAS was surprisingly well attended, given I spoke at the same time as Jo Brand, who I met on my way to the loos (we exchanged nods, as one speaker at the Cambridge Union does to another: it is not the done thing to make much of these things). I'm not sure how many CICCU people turned up, since they didn't make themselves known to me (apparently one woman was frantically making notes during my sermon, a well known evangelical habit, so I suspect there were a few). I spoke too fast, but people in Cambridge hear fast, so that's probably OK.
Below, you can find my notes, with some hyperlinks to expand on the things I said. ( Read more... )
There was a question and answer session afterwards. I remember some questions along the lines of:( Read more... )
Thanks to CUAAS for inviting me and giving me pizza. I had fun, and I hope my listeners did too.
Edited: Rave reviews continue to pour in. Well, William liked it, anyway, and has some observations on "atheist societies" to boot. - Tags:atheism, bible, cambridge university, christianity, ciccu, doubt, eliezer yudkowsky, morality, my life, theodicy, william lane craig
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| Friends have been playing with Spotify, which it turns out has a whole load of Matt Redman songs (imagine U2 singing about how Jesus is their boyfriend, and you've got it). I heard Redman at Soul Survivor when I went, many years ago. Though the charismatic services were a little bit scary at first, the whole thing fired me up to the extent that I alarmed my parents on my return by saying I was thinking of training for the ministry (I could have been the next John W. Loftus). At one of those services, I ended up wondering whether I should ask for prayer for healing. Looking back, I can perhaps understand how the Neumanns thought it was better to pray than phone an ambulance. The question of what, if anything, God is up to these days is a tricky one, and it's easy to get it wrong.
Praise the Prophets
 A while ago, the Word of Dawkins came unto me, and the Spirit of Rationality
rested upon me, and I spake forth, saying: "most believers already
know what excuses to make for the apparent absence of dragons or gods, even as
they claim belief in them, so they're keeping a map of the real world
somewhere. The believers without the map are the ones other believers regard
either as shiny-eyed lunatics, like the folk who don't go to doctors because
God will heal them." Prophetic, no? (You may say that I'd read about similar
cases in the past, but I think you're bringing a question-begging assumption of
metaphysical naturalism to my text).
Rowan Williams has a map. He recently told everyone not to expect God to do
much about global warming (by the way, Newsarse's
version of the story is good fun). Likewise, in the Neumanns' situation, most Christians would call a doctor. So, I don't think God is going to stop global warming or heal
diabetics (much less amputees), and, for the most
part, Christians don't either. Of course, I don't attempt to
excuse the absence
of the dragon by telling the story of the man on the roof of his house
in the flood. But when you consider what we anticipate will
happen, we're not so very different after all.
Wasted youth
 When I was a Christian, it seemed there was an unspoken understanding on these matters. God made all that is, seen and unseen; Jesus did all those miracles you read about in the New Testament; the statistical likelihood was that Jesus would, in the fullness of time, come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and bring fresh supplies of lemon-soaked paper napkins. God could do anything. Still, right now, you were more likely to see answers to prayer about work stress and for courage to evangelise your friends than answers to prayers for people to be healed of cancer. Or at least, it was best not to be too surprised that prayers for the big stuff might be "answered in a different way". (That is, if someone dies, they don't have cancer any more. No, really, this is not a joke). There were people who asked annoying questions about why God didn't do more, dissatisfied customers if you will, but I just found them irritating. God obviously existed, so why couldn't they just realise that?
The Neumanns did without this tacit understanding, which is unfortunate because having the understanding means you have the map: it's what allows Christians to get along in polite society without, say, being jailed for killing their children. Rather, just as Elijah did, the Neumanns anticipated-as-if God would act. They believed Biblical promises on prayer, as reiterated by their
supporters here and here.
So what went wrong? Well, regular readers will know that God isn't real, though Christians can hardly say so. The usual excuse won't do, alas: it can't be
that the Neumanns lacked faith. A family with sufficient faith to
gather to pray around their ailing child as she lies on her deathbed
is surely an example for Christians everywhere, even the ones who believe in
doctors. Likewise, even if God has provided doctors, it seems mean-spirited for God to penalise the Neumanns for not using them: which of you, if his son asks for bread, will give him a stone? We must look for better excuses.
Things not seen
Perhaps those Bible verses aren't intended to be the promises they seem to be (though they seem pretty clear to me, so if you encounter this argument, I hope you will chastise the person making it for twisting the Scriptures). Perhaps, as the Neumanns apparently believe, God foreknew that the kid would eventually turn
away from Jesus, and took her home early to prevent it (though I'm disappointed by their liberalism, in that after their child died, they didn't slit the throats of the local pastors and turn instead to Baal, Satan or Dawkins, which would have been a more biblical response). Still, both these explanations are at least possible, and if the maintenance of your belief is itself a virtue, that possibility
should suffice. As recent convert Sam Harris says:
These people [that is, neo-militant rationalist atheists like Jerry
Coyne] are simply obsessed with finding the best explanation for
the patterns we witness in natural world. But faith teaches us that the
best, alas, is often the enemy of the good. For instance, given that
viruses outnumber animals by ten to one, and given that a single virus like
smallpox killed 500 million human beings in the 20th century (many of them
children), people like Coyne ask whether these data are best explained by
the existence of an all knowing, all powerful, and all loving God who views
humanity as His most cherished creation. Wrong question Coyne! You see, the
wise have learned to ask, along with Miller, whether it is merely possible,
given these facts, that a mysterious God with an inscrutable Will could
have created the world. Surely it is! And the heart rejoices...
Of course, one mustn't carry this sublime inquiry too far. Some have asked whether it is possible that a mysterious God with an inscrutable Will works only on Tuesdays or whether He might be especially fond of soft cheese. There is no denying that such revelations, too, are possible - and may be forthcoming. But they do not conduce to joy, chastity, homophobia, or any other terrestrial virtue - and that is the point. Men like Coyne and Dennett miss these theological nuances. Indeed, one fears that these are the very nuances they were born to miss.
Perhaps God is not deceased, but merely pining for the fjords. This, too, is possible. And the heart rejoices... | |
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| Following on from his review of two books by theistic evolutionists, Jerry Coyne recently wrote an article criticising the US National Academy of Sciences for saying that evolution and Christianity are compatible. Richard Hoppe at Panda's Thumb disagrees with Coyne, but P Z Myers supports him. Atheist fight! Is evolution compatible with Christianity? Well, yes and no. I was a Christian who believed in evolution. This means not having good answers to some stuff Christians might care about: was the Fall a real event, and if not, where does original sin come from? Did physical death really enter the world through sin? If, as Christians usually argue as part of their theodicy on natural disasters, creation itself was corrupted in the Fall (whatever the Fall was), how exactly does that work? If you're a Christian who accepts evolution, you don't need atheists to ask these awkward questions, your creationist brothers ( and sisters) will do a much better job of it. But that doesn't show incompatibility. If you keep running into these problems and have to keep adding ad hoc patches to your theory, you should consider discarding it, but there are things I don't have good answers to as an atheist, and that hasn't stopped me being one. I was a student of science who was a Christian. That seems to be where the real problem lies. Theistic evolutionists tend to say stuff like "Evolution could have been the way God did it" or "Maybe God nudges electrons from time to time". They might make a wider point about "other ways of knowing". At some point, someone is probably going to say "well, Science cannot prove your wife loves you, but you believe that, don't you?" The Less Wrong crowd recently discussed whether their community is and should be welcoming to theists. Theism, Wednesday, and Not Being Adopted is a good post which deserves reading on its own merits, but I was particularly interested in Eliezer Yudkowsky's comment about compartmentalising rationality. If Wednesday [the child of Mormons mentioned in the article] can partition, that puts an upper bound on her ability as a rationalist; it means she doesn't get on a deep level why the rules are what they are. She doesn't get, say, that the laws regarding evidence are not social customs that can be different from one place to another, but, rather, manifestations of the principle that you have to walk through a city in order to draw an accurate map of it. Sam Harris mocks this compartmentalisation in his satirical response to Coyne's critics (the paragraphs following "Finally, Kenneth Miller, arrives" are the key ones). Science is one manifestation of the principle that you draw a map by walking the streets, not by sitting in your room and thinking hard about it. There are other legitimate forms of cartography, such as the one you apply when you conclude that someone loves you (assuming you're not actually a stalker). Perhaps, like the Tube map, they're not doing quite the same precise measurement as you'd expect from science, but they make useful maps. Recall the original point of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, before it developed into a cod-religion for annoying Christians with, like the worship of Invisible Pink Unicorn (PBUHHH). The FSM's inventor used it to point out that if you're going to say your god created the universe because you sat your room and had a strong inner conviction about it, on your own argument, the FSM revealed to me as a Pastafarian is as legitimate as the creator your conviction revealed to you. This point is not lessened if you say your god sometimes happens to do stuff in a way which isn't directly incompatible with known science. Perhaps theism isn't incompatible with evolution, but it is incompatible with good cartography. | |
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|  William liked the bit in my last post where I said that most believers are carrying a map of the real world somewhere, because they know in advance what excuses to make for the apparent absence of gods and dragons. Of course, I stole it from Overcoming Bias (mentioned previously here). Carl Sagan's point in the original invisible dragon story is about falsifiability. The crew over at Overcoming Bias use it another way, to think about what's going on in dragon-believer's head when they know enough anticipate the results of testing for the dragon, but not enough to say "there's no dragon". It's that sort of keen observation that keeps me going back to Overcoming Bias despite all the stuff about freezing your head when you die. The aim of the game for Biasers is to have a map which matches the territory, and to be able to read it aloud. They've started Less Wrong, a new site where anyone can contribute something they think will help achieve this aim. It's based on the code for Reddit, where users can vote stories up or down, though at Less Wrong, the editors manually promote stories to the front page, and there's a separate page where you can view stuff that's merely popular. You can follow Less Wrong on LiveJournal by adding ![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/syndicated.gif) less_wrong to your friends list. The community is working pretty well so far. Watching the decline of Kuro5hin makes me worry that community moderated sites will turn to crap (although there's still some good stuff over at k5, such as an article about the tendency of community moderated sites to turn to crap), but having real humans in charge of promoting articles might mitigate that. The system has given some new voices a chance, notably Yvain. Here are some of my favourite articles so far: I've made a few comments over there, although nothing earth-shattering: sympathising with someone whose girlfriend left him for Jesus, or talking about Bernard Woolley and irregular verbs. I've been thinking about posting some more about what I've got out of Overcoming Bias and Less Wrong here on LJ. It's all very well ranting about religion, but rationality isn't graded on a curve. Don't worry, religion-rant fans: I've got a few more of those lined up too. | |
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| A while back Andrew Brown over at the Grauniad posted a list of the 6 Points of New Atheism. There was a bit of a bun-fight among the atheists about this, because, though Brown's an atheist, he was criticising Dawkins Our Leader. It got even more fun when Dawkins turned up in the comments. (My own contribution was to treat the 6 Points as one of those internet quiz memes: I score 2.5/6 for New Atheism, which makes me slightly more Old Skool than New, I suppose). It's a bit like that Southpark episode where the Unified Atheist League fights the Allied Atheist Allegiance. What's the fuss about? Here's part of it.  Most Christians say God is omniscient and omnipresent. Yet the Christian woman whom Yellow blogged about, the one who wrote to a Christian problem page with her self-pleasuring problem, clearly doesn't really believe God is present and watching her all the time. But she at least believes that believing those things is virtuous for a Christian. The philosopher Daniel Dennett calls this latter sort of faith belief in belief. This doesn't just apply to religion. palmer1984 posted a poll which suggest similar things apply to moral beliefs. It is virtuous to say that we should care for people in other countries as much as we do for those in our own, but most people don't really believe it. Some people, especially those with a scientific education (or a certain sort of evangelical Christian background), think of belief as affirmation of a set of propositions. To those people, it's obvious that these propositions should not be internally contradictory or conflict with reality. But, as Saunt Yudkowsky observes "it is a physical fact that you can write "The sky is green!" next to a picture of a blue sky without the paper bursting into flames". The same applies inside our heads. Dr Vilayanur Ramachandan's fascinating experiments on anosognosia patients seem to show that explaining why a belief is valid and changing your beliefs are separate systems in the brain. I take Yudkowsky's point that speaking of belief doesn't capture the psychology here precisely because "beliefs" are often taken to be propositional sentences, but our brains don't deal in those much. Instead of talking about what someone "really believes", I suppose he'd prefer to say that the woman speaks-as-if she believes God is omnipotent and omnipresent, but, at least in some instances, behaves-as-if God is not. Brown says he's annoyed with neo-atheist rationalist fundamentalist sceptics because neo-atheists think that all brains work like theirs or can be convinced to do so, but that thinking is wildly optimistic. This is the point of Brown's Freud vs God post, which you should all go and read. See you in 5 minutes. Back? Brown's getting this stuff from Dennett and from anthropologists who study religion, such as Pascal Boyer. Boyer details his views over at a sceptics' website, where he tells sceptics off for their narrow understanding of religion. Another anthropologist, Scott Atran, does a similar thing on edge.org, responding to Sam Harris and others in the wake of the Beyond Belief conference back in 2006.  The anthropologists say that religious beliefs should not be understood as propositional statements about the world, however much they resemble them. What of God's omnipresence and omniscience? One thing religious people do with this belief is check whether an action is morally right by imagining what their model of God would think of it. This might be done retrospectively, if a religious context provokes thoughts of God. They certainly don't anticipate-as-if God is in the room and watching. Brown has linked the ideas of the anthropologists with the observation that most people don't try to formulate coherent propositions on anything, including religion. I don't know whether the anthropologists would agree with this, I'd need to read more of their stuff to tell. It's clear that most religious people do try to draw a map of the real world. As Yudkowsky illustrates with his dragon-believer example, most believers already know what excuses to make for the apparent absence of dragons or gods, even as they claim belief in them, so they're keeping a map of the real world somewhere. The believers without the map are the ones other believers regard either as shiny-eyed lunatics, like the folk who don't go to doctors because God will heal them; or as heroes of the faith for showing such belief, like the monks and martyrs. I'd paraphrase Brown's argument as "most people don't see the virtue of having one map for all occasions, or of being able to articulate it". Of course, if you're a religious believer, you might find the anthropologists' approach a little patronising. Some of you seem to have beliefs which are propositions about how the world is. As I said over on robhu's journal a while back, Dawkins at least does believers the courtesy of taking them at their word. What do you think? | |
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| Bart Ehrman's been on Unbelievable again, this time talking about the Problem of Evil: if God is good and all-powerful, why is there so much suffering in the world? His opposite number this time was Richard Swinburne, a Christian philosopher. Both of them have written books on the subject. I've read Ehrman's God's Problem but not Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil. The programme consisted of them both trying to get the arguments from their books into an hour long discussion. There's an MP3 of the programme available on Premier's site. If you get annoyed with people posting links to audio and video without summaries, you could read my notes, below the cut, or skip to the conclusion. ( What was said )Stiff upper lipsSwinburne's theodicy is that of the public school games master, telling the boys that cross-country runs, cold showers and being made to play rugby against the masters will build character, however unpleasant these things are at the time. By contrast, in God's problem, Ehrman tells us he has his students read Elie Wiesel's Night. Ehrman's book quotes Primo Levi's Auschwitz Report, as well as the memoirs of Rudolf Hoss, written shortly before he was hanged by the Poles near the crematorium of the death camp over which he presided. In the face of sort of thing, Swinburne sounds like Pangloss (5 points to anyone who can write an "Objection: What about Nazis?" verse expounding Swinburnism: the lyrics to the existing ones about snakes and war are here, so you can get the metre). Still, we ought to be careful of using the Holocaust as a sort of trump card in these debates, because it seems disrespectful of the dead, and also because it can be used as a tactic to imply that anyone who disagrees with you is automatically a bad person, which is the sort of thing that Christians might do, dammit (holding to a doctrine of total depravity is a big help with that sort of thing). So, what of Swinburne's argument? Why is this blog called "GCU Dancer on the Midway", anyway?I've mostly been ignoring Saunt Eliezer's recent stuff on Fun Theory over at Overcoming Bias because it triggers my (badly evidenced and probably irrational) " transhumanism: phooey" reaction, but as he says, "if you can't say how God could have better created the world without sliding into an antiseptic Wellsian Utopia, you can't carry Epicurus's argument". Luckily, I've had this argument before, and chose the Culture over my present existence. I think Swinburne is partly right, in that eliminating all possible causes of suffering actually does more harm than good. After all, one of those causes is other people making their choices, and other people who can make their own choices are interesting, even if the choices can lead to us ending up wearing the diaper (scroll down) from time to time. But why allow those choices to actually kill and maim people? Why aren't there angels acting as slap drones? (Saunt Eliezer thinks there are problems with the Culture, but they also apply to Christianity. I'm sure he'll tell us the right answer soon :-) There's not much point getting angry with a fictional character, but on the off-chance we encounter God on judgement day, we ought to say that he could have done better. | |
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| According to the Steven Novella's Neurologica blog, the Intelligent Design people (specifically the Discovery Institute) are getting interested in neuroscience (see also part 2), attacking the idea that consciousness has a physical basis and advocating Cartesian dualism. This seems to have been rumbling away for a while, but people are writing about it at the moment because New Scientist noticed. You can write a long article on what people have thought about consciousness, so what's the problem with the IDists joining in? First, neuroscientists are objecting to IDists' claims that scientific experiments prove things that those experiments don't actually prove. As Amanda Geffer of New Scientist points out, experiments that show therapy can alter brain function don't prove that the immaterial soul is acting on the brain, merely that the brain isn't indivisible, so parts can act on other parts. The therapy described reminded me of mindfulness therapies, and of Yudkowsky's recent reflections on Which Parts Are "Me"? ( Everything I am, is surely my brain; but I don't accept everything my brain does, as "me"). Novella also objects to IDists quote-mining (I'm shocked, shocked I tell you) from philosophers like David Chalmers in order to bolster their claims. Novella says that Chalmers does not argue for an immaterial spirit, so it is a mistake for those who do to claim him for their side. IDists could quote Chalmers if they wanted to argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, but it would be dishonest to quote him in support of their proposed solution, or indeed to say that the hard problem Chalmers speaks of has anything to do with evolution. Edited to add: Chalmers discusses the New Scientist article on his blog, and doesn't sound very impressed with the theists' efforts to recruit him for their cause. The Chalmers link came from Chris Hallquist, whose blog I recommend. Is this IDists' new strategy after they got planed in the Dover judgement? A while back, I mentioned that they might need a new way around the establishment clause in the US Constitution. I'm not sure this can be it, as consciousness isn't on the curriculum in most schools, but it does fit in with the wider strategy of looking for ways to undermine physicalism. | |
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| Some of you already read Overcoming Bias, the blog of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute (I've seen gjm11 commenting there, and wildeabandon mentioned it, I think). I've been reading quite a bit of the archives recently, as evidence by the number of comments I've made referring to old postings there. The bias of the title is cognitive bias, the psychological term for systematic mistakes human minds tend to make. The purpose of the blog is self-help and social change: "If we know the common patterns of error or self-deception, maybe we can work around them ourselves, or build social structures for smarter groups. We know we aren't perfect, and can't be perfect, but trying is better than not trying." Eliezer Yudkowsky is one of the main contributors there. He's an interesting character: heavily invested in ideas about the Singularity and Friendly AI. His stuff on Overcoming Bias touches on those interests, but is worthwhile even if you consider such ideas silly (I'm not sure whether I do or not at this point: my instinctive reaction that this stuff is far-fetched may be an example of bias). What I like about his writing is that it's usually clear and incisive. He shows a passion for reason (contrary to Star Trek, a passion for reason isn't a contradiction in terms) and almost a reverence for it. You get the feeling that his SF stuff about Bayesian masters undergoing the Ritual Of Changing One's Mind isn't just an illustrative analogy. Coming so soon after I read Anathem, I see the blog as one place where this world's avout hang out. Stuff like Diax's Rake would be right up their alley. livredor once told me that one of my biases is to latch on to someone very clever and align my beliefs to theirs (I think this bias is a common one among technical people who have taught themselves some philosophy). So I ought to be a little careful when I read his stuff. Yudkowsky's faults are that he's also self-taught, so needs his (likewise very clever) commenters to point out that he's covering old ground, has missed out on the standard arguments against his position, or is not using the standard definitions of some terms (such as the case where he argues his moral views are not moral relativism, for example). Some of the postings where he talks about how he used to think a whole load of wrong stuff and now doesn't can get tedious ( ahem). In some cases he's made extended series of posts where I don't understand the conclusion he's trying to draw (the series on morality is an example). Still, I'm very much enjoying articles like his articles on staging a Crisis of Faith (which isn't ultimately about losing religious faith, but about changing long-held opinions. It's good introduction to the blog as a whole, as there are links to many other good articles at the bottom of it), Cached Thoughts, Are Your Enemies Innately Evil? (shades of Bartlet's "They weren't born wanting to do this" there), Avoiding Your Belief's Real Weak Points, Belief in Belief (not quite your standard Dennett argument); and his argument that Elijah conducted the original scientific experiment. I recommend the blog to you lot. If you like reading blogs on LJ, you can find it at overcomingbias. | |
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