The wrong kind of God
In the comment thread over at Comment Sense Atheism, I wondered about the role of natural theology (that is, stuff like the Kalam Cosmological Argument) in preparing the ground for belief in the resurrection. When William Lane Craig debated against Bart Ehrman, Craig said "That Jesus rose naturally from the dead is fantastically improbable. But I see no reason whatsoever to think that it is improbable that God raised Jesus from the dead." According to Ayer (that is, the commenter over at Common Sense Atheism, not the logical positivist), "Natural theology shows the existence of the monotheistic God; the resurrection, in its religio-historical context, shows that that monotheistic God is the one described by Jesus and the disciples, whose redemptive purpose is laid out in the Bible."
There's an unwarranted assumption here. Suppose we grant, for the sake of argument, that the Kalam argument is valid. This gets us as far as deism. To get to Christianity, we need the resurrection, as Ayer says. But if God didn't do it, the resurrection is fantastically improbable, which I think means the New Testament evidence alone shouldn't convince us unless we assume that God is the sort of god who might raise Jesus from the dead. But why should we assume that? Remember, we need that assumption to bolster the NT evidence sufficiently for us to believe it, but the only available "evidence" that God is that sort of god is the resurrection itself, the very thing we're seeking to prove. I've not seen an argument from Craig (or any other apologist) which avoids this apparent circularity.
So we're stuck with being deists, which is a bit boring: as far as I know, they don't have any choons. Perhaps we might instead argue that the New Testament evidence is sufficient on its own: it shows Jesus rose, and hence (if we're feeling charitable about it) that there's a god of the right sort, Christianity is true, greatest hits of Charles Wesley here we come.
This was what the Parchment and Pen posting was about. C Michael Patton argues that alternative explanations are less simple than just accepting that Jesus rose from the dead. There was a thread on the local newsgroup, cam.misc, where another Christian made the same argument.
I remembered that Heinlein once said the simplest explanation is always "The lady down the street is a witch; she did it." What's wrong with that explanation? It hides complexity behind language, as Alex Selby explains. I ended up saying that the Christian account is "simpler" in some sense, but not in a sense that lends it credibility. In this sense, the "simplest" explanation for what you see in Derren Brown's stage shows is that mind reading really works and he's a master at it: all that other stuff he does to achieve the effects is extremely convoluted in comparison. Alex doesn't think we should describe that sense as simple. I can see his point, and perhaps I should have said that the Christian account feels simpler, rather than that it is.
At this point, a popular apologetic move is to accuse your opponent of assuming naturalism, materialism, scientism and other bad -isms (remember: if you have no other arguments, you can always play Spot The Worldview). I'm not sure whether that's a valid move. I think you'd need an argument that using this informational Occam's Razor won't do the job in the case of non-material stuff, which again, I haven't seen anyone attempt.